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Abstract
This paper aims to isolate the ethnic gap on the labor market that can be attributed
to ethnicity and not to diﬀerences in individual characteristics or residential location.
Controlling for residential location is important as ethnic minorities often live in dis-
tressed neighborhoods. It is also challenging because spatial sorting is likely to diﬀer
across ethnicities because of labor- or housing-market discrimination. This paper shows
that controlling for neighborhoods and observed individual characteristics fails to pro-
vide a consistent estimate for the component of the gap accountable to ethnicity only.
However, under some assumptions, the quantity of interest is set identiﬁed even when
heterogeneous sorting patterns across ethnicities are allowed for and the set estimate can
still be informative. A two-step estimation method is presented and applied to explain the
ethnic employment diﬀerential in France, between French individuals of North African
ancestry and those with non-immigrant parents. Most of the gap is not due to diﬀerences
in residential location or individual characteristics, but rather to ethnicity itself.
Keywords: ethnic employment gaps, spatial sorting, set identiﬁcation, discrimination, spatial
mismatch
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1 Introduction
In most countries, ethnic minorities are disproportionately more likely to live in distressed
neighborhoods. To what extent can their lower labor market performances be attributed to
ethnicity, and not to location? As Hellerstein and Neumark (2012) put it, is the issue of ethnic
gaps on the labor market place-based or race-based? Should public policies target areas or
ethnicities? Disentangling the eﬀects of ethnicity from those of location may seem straightfor-
ward: introducing a measure of neighborhood quality in the employment or the wage equation
would solve the problem. This paper shows that it is not the case: when ethnic minorities
have spatial sorting behaviors that diﬀer from the majority population, controlling for lo-
cation does not yield consistent estimates. This article makes three contributions. First, a
theoretical model shows that ethnically-asymmetric spatial sorting is likely to occur under
reasonable assumptions. Second, we show that the ethnic gap attributable to ethnicity can
only be partially identiﬁed and we provide a method to estimate the bounds. Finally, this
method is applied to the employment gap of French workers of North African ancestry com-
pared to those with French parents: the ethnic gap in the employment rate is mostly due to
ethnicity and not to diﬀerentials in individual traits or residential location.
Residential location may aﬀect employment status through several channels. First, the spatial
mismatch hypothesis, ﬁrst postulated by Kain (1968), states that living further away from
jobs reduces workers' employment probability.1 Second, human capital externalities may play
a role: living in a place where everyone is unemployed makes it harder for a job-seeker to ﬁnd
work (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Bayer, Ross, and Topa, 2008; Ioannides, 2011). Because lo-
cation is endogenous, individuals with diﬀerent preferences or characteristics are going to sort
across places. This sorting can result in statistical hiring discrimination based on residential
location (redlining), decreasing the employment rate in some neighborhoods.
Spatial mismatch, local human-capital externalities or redlining may explain why, regard-
less of ethnicity, some areas exhibit lower employment rates than others. However, ethnic
minorities have lower employment rates, regardless of where they live. Ethnic labor-market
discrimination is an appealing explanation as it has been documented to hamper hiring for
Blacks in the US as well as French of North African ancestry in France.2 Recent empirical
evidence for the US (Ritter and Taylor, 2011) and for France (Aeberhardt, Fougère, Pouget,
1See e.g. Ellwood (1986); Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998); Ihlanfeldt (2006); Gobillon and Selod (2007) for
empirical elements about spatial mismatch in the US and in France and Gobillon, Selod, and Zenou (2007)
for a comprehensive theoretical survey. See also Zenou (2009, Part 3).
2See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Duguet, Leandri, L'Horty, and Petit (2010) for correspondence
studies on ethnic hiring discrimination, in the US and in France.
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and Rathelot, 2010) suggest that, if some ethnic discrimination occurs on the labor market,
it is more likely to occur at the hiring stage than at the wage-setting stage.3 In addition to
ethnic discrimination, other factors may be at work, such as cultural transmission of labor
participation (Fernandez and Fogli, 2009) or diﬀerences in social-network quality.
This paper aims to separate the component of the ethnic employment gap due to ethnicity
from diﬀerences in neighborhoods of residence and individual characteristics. Controlling for
location seems to be important, because ethnic minorities tend to live in more distressed
neighborhoods and location is believed to have a causal impact on labor-market outcomes.4
However, we show that introducing a proxy for neighborhood quality (or, even better, ﬁxed
eﬀects for location) in the employment equation is only valid when ethnic groups have sym-
metric sorting behaviors, i.e. when, conditional on their characteristics (whether observed
or unobserved), individuals from the majority and the minority locate in places of similar
quality. We present a simple theoretical framework showing that, if discrimination towards
the minority exists on either the housing or the labor markets, individuals from the minority
are less likely to be located in good places, conditional on their characteristics. This also
implies that, conditional on neighborhood quality and observed characteristics, individuals
from the minority will have better unobserved traits. Interestingly, we show that, conditional
on neighborhood quality, minority individuals do not necessarily have better observed traits,
so that computing ethnic diﬀerentials in observables within a location is not a valid indicator
for spatial sorting. Empirically, we ﬁnd that workers of North African origin tend to live in
worse neighborhoods than those with French parents that have similar observed characteris-
tics, which signals a potential asymmetric spatial sorting.
When sorting is asymmetric, controlling by location is not enough, because the expectation of
unobservables is diﬀerent across groups even conditional on location and observables. For in-
stance, discriminated minorities that live in the best neighborhoods probably have extremely
good unobservable traits. A second contribution of this paper is to show that, even when sort-
ing is asymmetric, the ethnic employment gap attributable to ethnicity can still be partially
identiﬁed under reasonable assumptions. When the minority locates in worse neighborhoods
than the majority conditional on individual characteristics, controlling for characteristics only
provides a lower bound while controlling for both characteristics and location provides an up-
per bound. We propose a semi-parametric two-step method to estimate these bounds.
3See also Abowd and Killingsworth (1984), Fairlie and Sundstrom (1999) for other evidence about the
ethnic employment diﬀerentials and Neal and Johnson (1996) about the small size of the ethnic wage gap in
the US.
4This is related to Black, Kolesnikova, Sanders, and Taylor (2013) who study the eﬀect of controlling for
location  MSAs or regions, in their case  on the black-white wage gap in the US.
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Finally, we apply this method to compare individuals whose parents are North-African mi-
grants to those with French non-migrant parents, using the French Labor Force Survey (Insee,
Paris) from 2005 to 2011. While the raw ethnic employment gap is equal to 21 percentage
points (55% vs. 76%), 13 to 17 percentage points are due to ethnicity only and not due to
diﬀerences in observable characteristics or residential location. The main result of this study
is in line with the one of Hellerstein, Neumark, and McInerney (2008) in the US case: hurdles
associated with residential location are not key to explain ethnic minorities' unemployment.
Using a diﬀerent methodology, Gobillon, Rupert, and Wasmer (2014) also ﬁnd that spatial
factors are not the primary explanation of ethnic gaps in France.
The next section presents the data and some summary statistics. In section 3, a simple
theoretical model explains how discrimination on the housing or on the labor market may
generate asymmetric residential sorting. Moreover, we provide insights for the existence of
bounds in a simple linear framework. Section 4 presents the main identiﬁcation results in
a more general setting and details the estimation strategy. The results are presented and
discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and summary statistics
2.1 Data source and sample
In this paper, the empirical analysis is based on the French Labor Force Survey (LFS, In-
see), from 2005-Q1 to 2011-Q4. The sampling frame of the LFS involves geographical cluster
sampling and goes as follows. First, using information from the 1999 Census (until 2010)
and the 2006 Housing Tax ﬁles (from 2010 on), primary sample units (of several thousands
inhabitants) are selected using stratiﬁed random sampling. Then, within each of these pri-
mary units, at least one cluster, consisting of between 120 and 240 contiguous households, is
deﬁned. The cluster level is useful to control for very local neighborhood eﬀects. Some local
characteristics aﬀecting one household in a given cluster will undoubtedly aﬀect the other
households in the same cluster. Note also that, by deﬁnition, clusters are stricty included in
municipalities (the smallest administrative unit), so that the inhabitants of a given cluster are
assumed to be supplied with comparable public goods. For privacy reasons, the data associate
each household to a cluster ID, but the geographical location of clusters is unknown.
In this study, we compare a minority group to a majority group. In line with the literature,
the minority group we focus on have at least one parent born with a North African citizen-
3
ship.5 As a comparison, some results are also given on individuals with Southern European
parents. The majority group have both parents born French in France. Individuals from both
groups are all born in France and have a French citizenship. Therefore, the analysis deals with
individuals who are not migrants themselves. There are two reasons for this: ﬁrst, education
or labor experience acquired in France or abroad may be viewed diﬀerently by French employ-
ers; second, a certain command of French may also account for variability in employment rates.
Our outcome of interest is the employment status.6 Gender, education and age are used
as explanatory variables. The education variable reﬂects both the level and the ﬁeld of the
obtained degree, resulting in twenty dummies. Age and age squared are included in all
speciﬁcations. The sample is restricted to individuals aged 20 to 59.
2.2 Disparities in individual characteristics
Table 1 presents some summary statistics on the three subpopulations: the reference group
in the ﬁrst column, French individuals of North African and Southern European ancestries in
columns 2 and 3.
[Insert here Table 1]
The most striking fact is that individuals of North African origin have worse labor market
outcomes than other groups; they are less likely to work (55% vs. 76%) and those who do
earn around 16% less. They are less likely to be executive or professional (6% vs. 13%), to
occupy technical or sales occupations (15% vs. 20%) or to work in agriculture (0% vs. 2%).
They are slightly more likely to be oﬃce workers or blue collars and far more likely to have
no reported occupation (31% vs. 18%). By constrast, the employment rate of the individuals
of Southern European origin is very close to the one of the reference population. They earn
4% less and are less often employed in executive positions (10% vs. 13%).
The low employment rate in the group of North African ancestry is to some extent linked to
their individual characteristics. First, they have less education: 4.6% of them hold a Master's
degree, a diploma from a Elite university, or a PhD, while 7.8% of the reference population
do so. They also frequently end up with no qualiﬁcations at all. 33% of them dropped out of
the system with no diploma at all or the basic Brevet des Collèges (taken at the end of the
9th grade), while this is only the case for 24% of the French with French parents. Second,
5Since 2005, the LFS includes questions about one's parents' nationality at birth.
6The analysis has been replicated using the log-wages as the outcome. However, in line with the previous
literature, the ethnic wage gap is entirely explained by diﬀerences in education and age. Detailed results are
available from the author upon request.
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this minority group is on average 8 years younger than the rest of the population. Individuals
of Southern Europe origin do not diﬀer much from those with French parents on all these
characteristics. They are slightly less likely to hold a postgraduate degree and their average
age is only 9 months lower than the majority group.
2.3 Spatial disparities
Clusters diﬀer in several ways. Table 2 provides some summary statistics at the cluster level.
The ﬁrst two columns provide descriptive statistics for all clusters, unweighted (column 1) or
weighted by cluster size (column 2). Weighting by size provides an insight about the typical
cluster from the point of view of an individual. The last two columns provide descriptive
statistics for clusters in which the majority group coexist with at least one individual from a
minority: North African ancestry (column 3) or Southern European ancestry (column 4). We
name these kinds of clusters mixed clusters and denote the set of mixed clusters with the
minority of North African ancestry asM.
[Insert here Table 2]
Depending on the sampling frame, the local response rate and local characteristics, some
clusters may be substantially larger than others. Overall, the median cluster contains 36
individuals. From the point of view of individuals, the median size is 62. Mixed clusters are
larger, but the direction of causality is not clear, as larger clusters are more likely to exhibit
diversity. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the number of individuals per cluster in more
detail.
[Insert here Figure 1]
The ﬁgure displays a large diversity of situations, with a minimum of 1 observation, a mode
at 15 observations and a maximum at 196 observations.
As clusters can be considered, by construction, as independent draws over the French territory
of groups of individuals living contiguously, the heterogeneity of clusters reﬂects social and
ethnic residential disparities.7 The ﬁrst and third quartiles of the employment rate are 67%
and 83%, which reﬂects the heterogeneity of economic conditions across clusters. Only half
of the clusters mix individuals from both the majority group and the minority with North
African ancestry. In the median cluster in which they are present, individuals from this mi-
nority group represent 5% of the inhabitants.
7More elements about the distribution of the employment rate and the share of the minority group across
clusters are provided in appendix A.1.
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In mixed clusters where people with North African ancestry are present, the employment rate
is 3 percentage points lower. Figure 2 shows the results of non-parametric (kernel) regressions
of the employment rate (left panel) and of the share of dropouts (right panel) on the minority
share in the cluster.
[Insert here Figure 2]
The employment rate and the share of dropouts are displayed for both the majority popula-
tion and for individuals with North African parents. For the employment rate, both curves
exhibit a pronounced downward trend. For the share of dropouts, both curves are increasing
(past a slight initial decrease) and the curve of the majority group is steeper than the one for
the minority.
The key descriptive facts are the following. First, people with North African parents have
signiﬁcantly lower employment chances, which might be explained to some extent by lower
levels of education and less experience. Second, they seem to be more concentrated in areas
in which the employment rate is lower.
3 Conceptual framework
This subsection presents a simple theoretical framework of spatial sorting. Individuals may
live in two locations, center c or suburbs s. Locations provide diﬀerent levels of amenities
depending on individuals' employment status and also aﬀect the probability of employment.
The population is assumed to be composed of two ethnic groups: the majority group 0 and the
minority group 1. The minority group potentially faces housing- and labor-market discrimi-
nation. This simple model shows that such discrimination can generate asymmetric sorting:
minority individuals with similar characteristics will live more often in the suburbs, which
oﬀer less amenities and provide lower probability to work.
Imagine ﬁrst that there exist only group-0 individuals, in number N0. The utility of living
in location a ∈ {c, s} depends on the individual's probability to work, the utility associated
with the employment status and the rent. An individual i's probability to work depends
on her observed characteristics Xi, her unobserved characteristics ui and her location a:
pi(a) = p(Xi, ui, a). Living in the suburbs is assumed to reduce one's probability of working,
so that pi(s) < pi(c). This eﬀect results from several phenomena. First, spatial mismatch
implies that living further away from jobs harms one's probability to learn about the existence
of vacancies (Kain, 1968). Second, redlining, as deﬁned in Zenou and Boccard (2000), implies
that workers living in the suburbs may suﬀer from some of kind of spatial discrimination,
irrespective of ethnicity. Diﬀerent reasons may lead to the existence of this discrimination,
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whether it is based on prejudice about inhabitants' human capital or propensity to commit
crimes (Zenou and Boccard, 2000) or statistical discrimination due to a productivity loss as-
sociated with commuting (Zenou, 2002). On top of these two eﬀects, equilibrium network
eﬀects may also play a role: peer eﬀects, combined with sorting, are likely to exacerbate the
existing diﬀerences between the center and the suburbs. Finally, we assume for simplicity
that pi(s) = ρppi(c) with ρp ∈ (0, 1), and we denote pi = pi(c) and p(Xi, ui) = p(Xi, ui, c)
Being employed in c brings utility v¯, while being employed in s brings a lower utility v < v¯.
The utility of being unemployed is equal to ρv ∈ (0, 1) times the utility of being employed.
Note that, together, these two assumptions mean that the gap in utility between employed
and unemployed individuals is larger in the center than in the suburbs. This is justiﬁed by
the fact that living in the center provides amenities that may be valued more by employed
people. In particular, given the geography of jobs and the structure of transportation systems,
living in the center entails lower commuting times than living in the suburbs; see e.g. the
benchmark model presented in Zenou (2009, chap.1).
Housing in s is inﬁnitely supplied, so that rents in s are equal to zero. Conversely, housing
in the center is assumed to be constrained: the C available units are allocated to the highest
bidders. Rents in c are denoted as h. The utilities of group-0 individuals can thus be written
as:
U0i (c) = piv¯ + (1− pi)ρvv¯ − h
U0i (s) = ρppiv + (1− ρppi)ρvv
Note that U0i (c), U
0
i (s) and the diﬀerence ∆U
0
i
.
= U0i (c) − U0i (s) are all increasing in pi.
Therefore, individuals with the best characteristics are those with the highest gains from
being in the center rather than in the suburbs. These individuals secure housing in the center
by bidding
h = ρv(v¯ − v) + (1− ρv)(v¯ − ρpv)p∗ , with p∗ = F−10
(
N0 − C
N0
)
where F0(.) is the cumulative distribution function of pi in the majority group. Note that this
distribution depends on the distributions of Xi and ui.
Now, N1 individuals from the minority group 1 are introduced in the market. The major
diﬀerence across ethnic groups in this model is that individuals from the minority may suﬀer
from housing and/or labor market discrimination. Housing discrimination is assumed to
increase their rent from h to h/τh, with τh ∈ (0, 1). Labor-market discrimination is assumed
to decrease their probability to work by a factor τp ∈ (0, 1), to τpp(Xi, ui, a). Consistently
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with the assumptions made throughout the paper, the distribution of u conditional on X is
assumed to be identical across groups. However, ethnic groups may diﬀer in terms of their
observed characteristics X. In the minority group, the cumulative distribution function of pi
(the pre-discrimination probability to work) is denoted as F1(.). The individual utilities for
an individual i from the minority can be written as:
U1i (c) = τppiv¯ + (1− τppi)ρvv¯ − h/τh
U1i (s) = ρpτppiv + (1− ρpτppi)ρvv
The utility gains of living in the center rather than in the suburbs ∆Ugi
.
= Ugi (c) − Ugi (s),
with g ∈ {0, 1}, are diﬀerent across ethnic groups:
∆U0i = ρv(v¯ − v) + (1− ρv)(v¯ − ρpv)pi − h
∆U1i = ρv(v¯ − v) + (1− ρv)(v¯ − ρpv)τppi − h/τh
The existence of discrimination on either the housing or the labor markets makes individuals
from the majority experience larger gains from living in the center rather than in the sub-
urbs, conditional on characteristics (summarized by pi), compared to minority individuals.
Applying the same reasoning as above, the housing slots in the center are allocated to the
highest bidders. Denote N c0 and N
c
1 the number of individuals in each group that will live in
the center, and p∗0 and p∗1 the thresholds beyond which these individuals choose to live in the
center. The rent h is such that :
h = ρv(v¯ − v) + (1− ρv)(v¯ − ρpv)p∗0 , with p∗0 = F−10
(
N0 −N c0
N0
)
(1)
= τhρv(v¯ − v) + τhτp(1− ρv)(v¯ − ρpv)p∗1 , with p∗1 = F−11
(
N1 −N c1
N1
)
(2)
Combining equations (1) and (2) leads to:
p∗1 =
p∗0
τhτp
+
1− τh
τpτh
ρv(v¯ − v)
(v¯ − ρpv)(1− ρv) (3)
Equation (3), together with the deﬁnitions of p∗0 and p∗1 and the constraint that N c0 +N c1 = C,
pinpoints a value for N c0 and N
c
1 .
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If there exists labor-market discrimination but no housing discrimination, the cutoﬀ in terms of
actual (post-discrimination) probability to work is equal across groups, and sorting arises only
because of the existence of a wedge between the pre-discrimination and the post-discrimination
probability to work for minority individuals. If there exists housing discrimination, higher
8Note that, without further restriction on the distribution of characteristics in the minority population, it
is a priori possible to have Nc1 = 0.
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rents for minority workers shift up the probability to work required to get access to housing
in the center. Provided that τh < 1 or τp < 1, the minimum value of pi such that the indi-
vidual chooses to settle in the center is higher in group 1 than in group 0. The existence of
ethnic discrimination on either the housing or the labor market creates an ethnic asymmetry
in the location choices. Workers from the minority group need better characteristics in order
to choose to locate in the center. Therefore, conditional on Xi and ui (i.e. conditional on pi),
the quality of the neighborhood in which workers settle is lower for the minority than for the
majority. Given that ui is assumed to be equally distributed across groups conditional on Xi,
the previous statement remains true conditional on Xi only.
In the case of two locations (center vs. suburbs), it is easy to show that individuals from
the minority have, on average, higher unobservables ui than individuals from the majority,
conditional on observables Xi and location a. Because p∗1 > p∗0 and the distribution of ui|Xi
is assumed identical across groups,
E[ui|p(Xi, ui) > p∗1, Xi] > E[ui|p(Xi, ui) > p∗0, Xi]
E[ui|p(Xi, ui) < p∗1, Xi] > E[ui|p(Xi, ui) < p∗0, Xi]
Intuitively, we might believe that a similar statement should hold for observables: a higher
cutoﬀ for minority individuals would induce minority individuals to be better on average in
each neighborhood. However, because the distributions of observables may strikingly diﬀer
across groups, no such statement can easily be made. To go further, we develop a particular
case in appendix A.2. in which we impose linear dependence between the variables to get
the analysis tractable. Using this linear model, we ﬁnd that, for some values of the param-
eters, minority individuals may have lower observables than the majority population, even
conditional on location. A necessary condition (in that linear model) for this to occur is that
the marginal distributions of observables should be such that minority individuals have much
lower observables than majority individuals.
4 Set identiﬁcation and estimation of the bounds
This section shows in a general setting that, when location has a causal eﬀect on employment
and when ethnic groups have diﬀerent sorting behaviors conditional on their characteristics,
the causal impact of the ethnic group on employment is only partially identiﬁed. Interestingly
for applied purposes, identiﬁcation does not rely on functional assumptions or on the ability
to measure neighborhood quality. An estimation method for the bounds is then presented.
This method, based on matching, only gives a limited role to parametric assumptions and
is especially appealing when the number of observations per spatial unit is small, as the
incidental parameter problem is accounted for.
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4.1 Assumptions and identiﬁcation issues
The notation used in this section is adapted from the Rubin framework (Rubin, 1974). The
outcome Y , in our case the employment status, is a random variable that takes two potential
values Y (0) and Y (1) depending on the group the individual belongs to. For a given individ-
ual, only the realization of Y (0) (resp. Y (1)) is observed if the individual belongs to group
0 (resp. 1). The quantity of interest of this paper is the ethnic gap E(Y (1) − Y (0)|g = 1).
The average employment rates in groups 0 and 1 are the direct empirical counterparts of
E(Y (0)|g = 0) and E(Y (1)|g = 1). The diﬃcult part is the identiﬁcation of the counter-
factual E(Y (0)|g = 1). As is well known from the evaluation literature, no direct empirical
counterpart is available for this quantity without further assumptions about how unobervables
diﬀer across groups.
We ﬁrst make an assumption about the form of the model. The outcome is assumed to
depend only on observable characteristics X, unobservable characteristics u and the cluster
of residence a.
Assumption 1. [Ignorability on observables and unobservables].
∀(X,u, a),E(Y (0)|X,u, a, g = 0) = E(Y (0)|X,u, a, g = 1)
Even though this assumption looks like a traditional ignorability assumption, it is much
weaker, as one conditions on both observables and unobservables.
The second assumption, about the distribution of unobservables conditional on observables,
is probably the most restrictive one. Φ.(.) denotes cdf and φ.(.) pdf.
Assumption 2. [Conditional equidistribution of unobservables].
∀(X,u),Φu|X,g=0(u|X, g = 0) = Φu|X,g=1(u|X, g = 1)
Conditional on our set of individual characteristics, unobservable determinants u of employ-
ment have to be distributed in the same way across groups. This assumption, which is
frequently omitted in the decomposition literature (Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo, 2011), is re-
quired to isolate the component of the ethnic emloyment rate gap that is due to ethnicity.
One can imagine many stories why this assumption may be violated and some of them are
discussed in subsection 5.3.
The preceding assumptions are not suﬃcient to identify the quantity of interest. One needs
to make another assumption about the inﬂuence of location, or about sorting. Most studies
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performing ethnic-gap decompositions ignore the inﬂuence of location. What they implic-
itly assume is that the inﬂuence of location on employment, conditional on observables and
unobservables, is of second order.
Assumption 3. [No conditional inﬂuence of location].
∀(X,u, a),E(Y (0)|X,u, a, g) = E(Y (0)|X,u, g)
In this case, one is able to proceed to decomposition in a classical non-spatial way. Under
assumptions 1-3, E(Y (0)|g = 1) can be showed to be equal to Y with:
Y
.
=
∫
E(Y (0)|X, g = 0)dΦX|g=1(X|g = 1)
If the inﬂuence of location cannot be ignored, another possibility is to assume that spatial
sorting is symmetric. Denote the probability to be located in neighborhood a conditional
on X, u and g as P[a|X,u, g]. When sorting is symmetric, P[a|X,u, g] does not depend on
ethnicity either, conditional on observable and unobservable traits. Moreover,
Assumption 4. [Symmetric spatial sorting].
∀(X,u, a),P[a|X,u, g = 0] = P[a|X,u, g = 1]
In the proof (in appendix A.3.) we also show that this assumption implies that the distribution
of the unobservables conditional on individual characteristics and location does not depend
on ethnicity. Under assumptions 1-2, 4, we have:
E(Y (0)|g = 1) = Y = Y
with:
Y
.
=
∫
E(Y (0)|X, a, g = 0)dΦX,a|g=1(X, a|g = 1)
This leads to an important practical conclusion. When sorting is symmetric, bounds collapse,
and regressions will provide the same result whether location is controlled for or not.
In this paper, assumptions 3 and 4 are considered to be unacceptable, as the inﬂuence of
location on employment cannot be ignored and spatial sorting is a priori asymmetric, as
evidenced in the previous section. Following the deductions of the theoretical framework, we
rather assume that having access to the best location is harder for the minority.
Assumption 5. [Asymmetric spatial sorting]. Individuals from the minority group are
less likely, conditional on X and u to be located in areas that cause higher employment.
∀(X,u),E(Y (0)|X,u, g = 0) ≥ E(Y (0)|X,u, g = 1)
Unobservables are, conditional on X and a, higher in group 1 than in group 0.
∀(X, a),E(Y (0)|X, a, g = 0) ≤ E(Y (0)|X, a, g = 1)
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This assumption, which is much weaker than assumption 4, leads to the main identiﬁcation
result of this paper.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1-2 and 5, E(Y (0)|g = 1) admits bounds that can be
identiﬁed.
Y ≤ E(Y (0)|g = 1) ≤ Y
The proof is provided in appendix A.4.
Note that, under assumptions 1 and 2, we may test assumption 4 against assumption 5. If
the null hypothesis Y = Y is rejected, so is the assumption of symmetric spatial sorting. The
sign of Y − Y provides the direction of the asymmetry of the sorting pattern. However, as
illustrated more clearly in the linear case, the magnitude of the diﬀerence cannot be directly
used to infer the extent of location eﬀects (see appendix A.2).
4.2 Estimation
This section is dedicated to the estimation of the bounds Y and Y . The following assumption
aims at simplifying the empirical analysis by ruling out the curse of dimensionality.
Assumption 6. [Single index]. The inﬂuence of observables can be captured by a single
index s(X) = Xθ ∈ R.
∃θ ∈ RK s.t. ∀(X, a),E(Y (0)|X, a, g = 0) = E(Y (0)|Xθ, a, g = 0)
The estimation proceeds in two steps: ﬁrst, estimate θ in the majority group; second, estimate
the bounds based on the observations for both groups.
E(Y |X, a) is estimated by conditional logit.9
E(Y |s(X), a) = Λ(Xθ + ϑa)
The inﬂuence of residential location is assumed to be restricted to additive ﬁxed eﬀects ϑ,
which shift the intercept without interacting with observable characteristics. Because the
incidental parameter problem can be solved in this way, Λ is assumed to be the logistic cdf.
Note that, under the speciﬁcation assumptions, this estimation allows one to recover unbiased
estimates for θ, but not for ϑ.
9The conditional logit has been recoded in R to account for the fact that some clusters are relatively large.
To speed up computations, the denominator of the likelihood is computed in C and interfaced with R, using
the package Rcpp (Eddelbuettel and François, 2011). The code of the estimation function is available upon
request.
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Once s(.) has been estimated for group 0, we can proceed to the estimation of Y and Y , by
matching individuals from the minority with those from the majority. Kernel matching is
used here, with a uniform (caliper matching) or an Epanechnikov kernel K(.). A bandwidth
parameter ν must be chosen beforehand. G0 (G1) is the set of majority (minority) individuals.
For a pair of individuals (i, j) ∈ G0 ×G1, we deﬁne the weights wij = K([s(Xj)− s(Xi)]/ν).
For Y , the algorithm goes as follows.
1. Consider an individual i ∈ G1, with characteristics Xi and location ai.
2. Deﬁne the set J (i) = {j ∈ G0, ai = aj and |s(Xj) − s(Xi)| < ν} of the G0 individuals
living in ai such that weights are strictly positive.
3. Compute and store the quantity
y(i) =
∑
j∈J (i)wijYj∑
j∈J (i)wij
and carry on for the next individual in G1.
For Y , the algorithm is simpler.
1. Consider an individual i ∈ G1, with characteristics Xi.
2. Deﬁne the set J (i) = {j ∈ G0, |s(Xj) − s(Xi)| < ν} of the G0 individuals such that
weights are strictly positive.
3. Compute and store the quantity
y(i) =
∑
j∈J (i)wijYj∑
j∈J (i)wij
and carry on for the next individual in G1.
The estimators Ŷ
.
= 1/N1
∑
i∈G1 y(i) and Ŷ
.
= 1/N1
∑
i∈G1 y(i) are considered as empirical
counterparts of the bounds Y and Y of the quantity of interest. The technical conditions
under which these estimators converge to Y and Y are not detailed here but they can be
directly adapted from Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998).
In order to account for the fact that there are two steps in the estimation, inference is per-
formed by bootstrap.10 At each iteration, we draw individuals with replacement and perform
the estimation. Standard errors and conﬁdence intervals are computed using 100 iterations.
10Abadie and Imbens (2008) prove that bootstrap fails to provide valid inference for matching procedures
with a ﬁxed number of neighbors. For kernel matching, however, they conjecture that bootstrap provide valid
inference.
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4.3 Support issues
This matching approach is similar to the one adopted by Nopo (2008) and is subject to the
same problems. The main issue, also detailed in Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011), is the po-
tential lack of commun support across groups. Because there are few observations per spatial
unit, some spatial units contain only minority individuals. In these cases, J (i) will be empty.
Even when the spatial unit contains individuals of both groups, J (i) or J (i) can be empty if
no individual of the majority group has characteristics which are close enough to the ones of
the minority individual. Note that the single-index assumption helps alleviate the latter issue.
Support issues are problematic when they do not occur randomly. Let G˜1 = {i ∈ G1,J (i) 6=
∅}, with NG˜1 = Card(G˜1). In practice, as in Nopo (2008), the estimator will be computed
over the subsample G˜1 for which there is no support issue, Ŷ = 1/NG˜1
∑
i∈G˜1 y(i). To assess
the extent to which lack of support is really an issue, the percentage of cases with support
problems ps = 1−NG˜1/N1 as well as the relative gaps are reported:
δy = 1−
∑
G˜1
Yi/NG˜1∑
G1
Yi/N1
δs = 1−
∑
G˜1
s(Xi)/NG˜1∑
G1
s(Xi)/N1
.
We can build another estimator for the lower bound that reduces the number of observations
excluded by the bandwidth. When a control individual is not found for a given individual of
interest, one can select as a control the nearest individual with a score lower than the individual
of interest. The resulting estimator will still be a lower bound, though a looser one. Formally,
this means that for an individual i of group 1, the control group J (i) is replaced, if it is
empty, by J ′(i) = {j ∈ G0 : s(Xj) = maxk{s(Xk) : ak = ai and s(Xk) < s(Xi) − ν}}. We
deﬁne:
y(i)∗ =
{
y(i) if J (i) 6= ∅
y′(i) if J (i) = ∅ and J ′(i) 6= ∅
with y′(i) =
∑
j∈J ′(i) Yj
Card(J ′(i))
The new estimator can be expressed as:
Ŷ
∗
=
∑
i∈G˜∗1 y(i)
∗
Card(G˜∗1)
with G˜∗1 = {i ∈ G1,J (i) ∪ J ′(i) 6= ∅}
p∗s, δ∗y and δ∗s , relating to the estimator Ŷ
∗
can also be computed.
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5 Results
5.1 Estimation of the employment equation
Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of the employment equation for the conditional
logit model, in which ﬁxed eﬀects for geographic clusters are included.
[Insert here Table 3]
Most coeﬃcients have the usual sign. Females are signiﬁcantly less often in employment than
males. The inﬂuence of age on employment displays an inverted U-shaped curve. Education
is measured both in terms of level and ﬁeld, relatively to the Bac, the degree obtained at the
end of high school and required to enter university. Health degrees are associated with the
highest probability of being employed. Higher levels of education and degrees with scientiﬁc
or industrial majors seem to increase one's propensity to work. Having no diploma at all is
associated with strongly lower probability of working.
5.2 Estimation of the bounds of the counterfactual employment level
Now that the employment equation has been estimated on population 0, we can estimate the
bounds of E(Y (0)|g = 1), Y and Y . Table 4 reports the estimates of the bounds. In columns
1 and 3, the matching kernel is uniform, while in columns 2 and 4, an Epanechnikov kernel is
used. In columns 1 and 2, the bandwidth is set to .05. In columns 3 and 4, the bandwidth is
set to .10.
[Insert here Table 4]
The employment gap between the two groups is on average equal to 20.7 percentage points,
with sample means equal to 75.7% in group 0 and 55.0% in group 1. Restricting the sample
to clusters in which both groups are present is necessary. This restriction does not aﬀect
much the sample means. The employment rate of majority in these mixed clusters is equal to
74.2%; for the minority group, it is unchanged: 55.0%. Within mixed clusters, the raw ethnic
employment gap is equal to 19.2 percentage points.
Now, we can present the result to the main question. Some of the 19 percentage-point ethnic
employment gap may be explained by the fact that individuals of the minority are on average
less educated, younger and live in more distressed areas. What part of the employment gap
can be attributed to ethnicity, rather than to diﬀerentials in observable traits or residential
location? Under the assumptions detailed above, upper and lower bounds can be estimated:
the counterfactual employment rate E(Y (0)|g = 1) is between 68% and 72% in all speciﬁca-
tions presented in table 4. This means that there is still between 13 and 17 percentage points
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that are not due to observed characteristics or residential location.
In Table 4, we also check empirically that Ŷ is higher than Ŷ . This inequality should be seen
as a test of consistency of Assumption 5 (asymmetric sorting). If sorting were symmetric, all
groups would have the same access to all neighborhoods, conditional on individual character-
istics. In that case, the bounds should be equal to each other, which is not the case here. The
asymmetry goes in the direction that we conjectured using summary statistics: conditional
on age and education, French individuals with North African ancestry are less likely to be
located in good neighborhoods than French with French parents.
Should we be concerned about support issues? In the ﬁrst column, because the bandwidth of
.05 is narrow, 10.1% of the minority individuals cannot be matched for the estimation of Ŷ .
Matched individuals are on average 1.8 percentage points more likely to work than the average
minority individual. The support issue is less severe when Ŷ
∗
is used instead. Only 4.0% of
the observations are not matched, with a gap between matched and average individuals lower
than 1 percentage point. For the other two speciﬁcations, the support issue looks even less
problematic, even for the estimator Ŷ . This is consistent with lower diﬀerences between the
estimates of Ŷ and Ŷ
∗
in columns 1 and 2. Overall, all four columns tell the same story.
A ﬁnal concern regarding common support is that, if controls and treated are too diﬀerent,
the analysis might rely too much on a small number of control observations; for instance if
one observation is used as a control for many treated observations. To investigate this issue,
we compute: (i) the number of control observations which are used at least once, (ii) the
number of control observations j such that
∑
iwij > 1. In the case of the Epanechnikov
kernel with bandwidth equal to .10, 63,491 observations are at least used once as controls
(for 8432 treated observations). Among them, only 504 have a summed weight higher than
1. On these observations,
∑
iwij has a mean of 1.8. Therefore, we expect our results to be
reasonably robust to this issue.
5.3 Discussion
The preceding results show that the ethnic employment gap is hardly explained by diﬀeren-
tials in individual characteristics or in residential location. The fact that individuals with
North African parents are more likely to live in distressed areas than the majority group
is not a suﬃcient explanation for their strikingly lower employment levels. The ﬁndings of
this paper have important policy consequences. France has a long tradition of ignoring the
ethnic dimension of inequalities, focusing on social or geographical dimensions. Public poli-
cies are designed accordingly: while ﬁscal incentives aim to achieve more economic equality
16
on a social basis (for instance, subsidizing the hiring of low-skilled workforce; see Crépon
and Desplatz (2001)) or a geographical one (subsidizing economic activity in distressed areas
through enterprise-zone-like policies; see Givord, Rathelot, and Sillard (2013)), policy makers
explicitly refuse to consider ethnicity among the possible criteria.11 This paper suggests that
some speciﬁc ethnically-targeted policy might be necessary to bridge ethnic gaps on the labor
market.
Designing adequate policy interventions requires being able to identify the economic mecha-
nisms at work. While one contribution of this paper is to rule out that diﬀerences in residential
location are the key explanation for ethnic diﬀerentials on the labor market, the next impor-
tant question is how to explain the massive residual ethnic gap? The leading explanations
in the literature are discrimination (statistical or taste-based), the existence of ethnic-speciﬁc
cultural traits, and ethnic diﬀerences in the quality of social networks. We provide two ad-
ditional pieces of evidence that suggest that the importance of culture and networks should
not be over-stated.
In the case of the US, Fernandez and Fogli (2009) argue that a signiﬁcant part of the em-
ployment gap between women of foreign origin and native women can be explained by the
female employment pattern in the woman's country of ancestry. If this phenomenon existed
in France, it would cumulate with the other factors underlying the ethnic gaps: discrimination
and diﬀerences in social networks have no reason to be a priori restricted to men. Therefore,
the employment diﬀerential due to ethnicity should be higher for women than for men. The
second column in Table 5 shows the estimated bounds of E(Y (0)|g = 1) when the sample is
restricted to women (both for the majority and the minority populations).12 Female employ-
ment rates in both groups are 4 to 5 percentage points lower than in the whole population.
While the total gap amounts to 19.7 percentage points, the gap that can be attributed to
ethnicity is between 14 and 16 percentage points. These ﬁgures are very similar to the 13-17-
percentage-point interval obtained on the whole sample. Since stratifying by gender does not
change the results, we conjecture that cultural transmission from women's country of ancestry
is not likely to be a crucial factor.
[Insert here Table 5]
11In a discourse dating from 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy declared If the question of measuring inequalities and
discriminations relating to national origin is open, the question of a voluntarist public action based on ethnic
or religious criteria should be closed. [...] if we reduce all the social diﬀerentials, we will reduce at the same
time all the ethnic, religious and cultural diﬀerentials. See Sarkozy (2008).
12For this column, the employment equation has been re-estimated on the subsample of women only.
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Social networks are believed to play a prominent role in one's access to jobs (Montgomery,
1991; Topa, 2001; Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004). By deﬁnition, immigrants have re-
cently settled in their country of residence and may not have had the time to develop a deep
social network.13 Networks of lower quality might prove detrimental to their children. A ﬁrst
issue with this theory is that it hardly explains the diﬀerences of employment rates across
ethnic minorities. Column 3 presents the decomposition for individuals of Southern European
origin (instead of North Africa) and shows, in a nutshell, that there are no diﬀerence between
this ethnic minority and the majority group.14 One could argue that Southern European mi-
grants arrived earlier than North African ones, but it is diﬃcult to believe that a diﬀerence of
ten or twenty years would provide such an impressive diﬀerence. Network theory also predicts
a diﬀerence between the employment rates of individuals with two immigrant parents and
those with only one immigrant parent. Column 3 shows the results when only individuals
with two immigrant parents are considered as the minority group, while, in column 4, only
those with an immigrant father and a non-immigrant mother are treated as the minority
group. Columns 1 and 4 are very similar, which suggests that ethnic diﬀerentials in networks
are not the main story.
Two warnings concerning the interpretation of the results should be explicated. First, con-
sistent with the spatial-mismatch or the redlining stories, we assumed that the impact of
residential location on employment was the same for both ethnic groups. If there exist some
location-interacted-with-ethnicity eﬀects, our analysis will count them as ethnically driven.
For instance, say that discrimination is the key factor to explain ethnic gaps. We will not
be able to distinguish whether discrimination is based on ethnicity only or on ethnicity inter-
acted with location. These ﬁndings also relate to the social network literature in which local
networks are shown to be, to some extent, ethnic-speciﬁc. Ethnic-related factors explaining
labor market outcomes, and their interactions with location, have yet to be disentangled.
Second, education is assumed to be exogenous, while education acquisition may actually diﬀer
between the two ethnic groups. OECD (2012) presents the results of the PISA 2009 survey
on 15-year-olds with immigrant parents. There are large discrepancies in the performance in
reading, maths and science between children with immigrant parents and those with native
parents. These diﬀerences tend to decrease when socio-economic background is accounted for,
but remain sizable in most countries, France included. If this phenomenon results, for instance,
from diﬀerentials in school quality or teachers' attitudes, it is possible that, conditional on
13There is an ethnic dimension in social networks, as evidenced by Topa (2001); Edin, Fredriksson, and
Åslund (2003); Munshi (2003).
14Actually, in this case, Ŷ is slightly lower than Ŷ , which tends to show that individuals of Southern
European origin are located in better neighborhoods than the majority, conditional on their characteristics.
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their initial traits, education acquisition is more diﬃcult for children from ethnic minorities.
Thus, more talent would be needed to acquire the same level of education. In that case, our
estimates of the part of the ethnic gaps that is inherently due to ethnicity would be biased
downwards: unbiased ethnic gaps due to ethnicity would be even larger.
6 Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions. First, as discussed in the previous section, ethnic em-
ployment gaps should be mostly attributed to ethnicity, and not to diﬀerentials in residential
location or observable characteristics. The second contribution is a methodological one, when
the goal is to isolate the part of the ethnic gap that is due to ethnicity only when the outcome
depends on both individual and neighborhood characteristics. Whether spatial sorting is sym-
metric across ethnic groups is shown to be crucial. If sorting is symmetric, valid estimates can
be obtained with or without neighborhood quality controls. If sorting is asymmetric, inclusion
or exclusion of neighborhood quality controls lead to two diﬀerents estimates and we show
under some assumptions that these two estimates are bounds for the quantity of interest. The
direction of the sorting, i.e. which group is more likely to locate in better neighborhoods, can
be infered from these bounds.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Populations
French North Africa Southern Europe
Labor market outcomes
Employment 75.7 55.0 75.8
Unemployment 6.9 18.3 7.7
Inactivity 17.4 26.8 16.4
Wage (if employed): Q1 1170 1020 1147
Wage (if employed): median 1500 1314 1485
Wage (if employed): mean 1702 1423 1627
Wage (if employed): Q3 2000 1700 1950
Cultivator 1.6 0.0 0.6
Retail, Craft 4.4 2.5 5.3
Professionals 12.8 6.1 9.9
Technicians, Sales 20.1 14.8 20.0
Oﬃce worker 24.0 25.6 26.8
Blue collar 18.7 20.4 20.0
No occupation 18.4 30.6 17.3
Education
Medicine doctorate 1.0 0.5 0.5
Master's degree and above 3.4 2.6 2.6
Master's Elite Universities 3.4 1.5 2.0
Univ.: Bac+4, Science-Industry 0.5 0.3 0.3
Univ.: Bac+4, other 2.6 2.1 2.4
Univ.: Bac+3, Science-Industry 0.8 0.7 0.6
Univ.: Bac+3, other 3.6 3.1 3.2
Univ.: Bac+2 1.9 1.5 1.7
Tech.: Bac+2, Industry 3.0 1.8 2.6
Tech.: Bac+2, other 6.2 6.9 6.3
Health: Bac+2 2.7 1.2 1.9
Bac: Humanities 5.7 7.0 6.1
Bac: Science 3.6 3.5 2.7
Bac: Technical, Industry 1.3 0.8 1.3
Bac: Technical, other 3.6 5.0 3.7
Bac: Vocational, Industry 3.2 2.3 2.9
Bac: Vocational, other 3.1 4.9 3.5
Bac-2: Vocational, Industry 14.8 10.3 16.0
Bac-2: Vocational, other 11.3 10.9 13.6
Lower Sec. Educ. Deg. 7.7 9.5 8.0
No diploma 16.6 23.7 18.0
Age
Age, years: Q1 29.0 24.0 29.0
Age, years: median 40.0 30.0 39.0
Age, years: mean 39.5 31.6 38.8
Age, years: Q3 50.0 37.0 48.0
Demography and family
Female 51.1 52.8 51.1
Couple 74.1 68.3 75.5
Working spouse 52.3 29.9 51.5
No child 58.3 49.5 55.8
1 child 19.5 23.0 21.5
2 children 16.1 17.4 17.5
3+ children 6.1 10.2 5.2
Youngest child less than 3 9.6 16.8 10.1
Nobs 220,802 8432 11,653
Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (Insee).
Note: All ﬁgures are proportions, expressed in percentage, except from the monthly wage (in euros)
and the age (in years).
Reading note: 75.7% of French individuals with French parents are in employment. 55.0% of French
individuals who have at least one parent born with the nationality of a North African country are
in employment.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, for clusters
Variables Clusters
All Only mixed: majority with...
North Africa Southern Europe
Proportion of minority group
Proportion (North Afr): Q1 0 0 0.024 0
Proportion (North Afr): median 0 0.0099 0.05 0.013
Proportion (North Afr): mean 0.041 0.033 0.088 0.042
Proportion (North Afr): Q3 0.045 0.037 0.11 0.052
Proportion (Southern Eur): Q1 0 0.0089 0.013 0.032
Proportion (Southern Eur): median 0.032 0.032 0.043 0.058
Proportion (Southern Eur): mean 0.05 0.046 0.057 0.075
Proportion (Southern Eur): Q3 0.075 0.068 0.083 0.097
Employment rate
Employment rate: Q1 0.67 0.69 0.64 0.68
Employment rate: median 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.76
Employment rate: mean 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.74
Employment rate: Q3 0.83 0.82 0.8 0.82
Number of individuals
Nb ind: Q1 19 38 25 25
Nb ind: median 36 62 46 45
Nb ind: mean 44 65 51 51
Nb ind: Q3 62 88 71 70
Nb ind (majority): Q1 16 32 19 20
Nb ind (majority): median 31 54 37 38
Nb ind (majority): mean 38 58 42 43
Nb ind (majority): Q3 54 80 59 60
Nb ind (North Afr): Q1 0 0 1 0
Nb ind (North Afr): median 0 1 2 1
Nb ind (North Afr): mean 1.5 1.8 3.1 1.8
Nb ind (North Afr): Q3 2 2 4 2
Nb ind (Southern Eur): Q1 0 1 1 1
Nb ind (Southern Eur): median 1 2 2 2
Nb ind (Southern Eur): mean 2 2.8 2.8 3.1
Nb ind (Southern Eur): Q3 3 4 4 4
Number of clusters 5742 5742 2689 3812
Weights No Cluster size No No
Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (Insee).
Note: In columns 1, 3 and 4, statistics are unweighted. In column 2, statistics are weighted by the
size of the clusters.
Reading note: The median cluster has an employment rate of 76%. Among the clusters mixing
the majority population and the minority population with North African ancestry, the median
employment rate is equal to 74%. From an individual point of view, the median size of a cluster is
62.
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Table 3: Estimation results of the employment equation
Cond. logit
Female −1.40∗∗∗
(0.25)
Experience
Age (/10) 2.13∗∗∗
(0.15)
Age (/10) squared −2.52∗∗∗
(0.20)
Education
Bac: Humanities Ref.
Medicine doctorate 0.47∗∗∗
(0.24)
Master degree and above 0.40∗∗∗
(0.05)
Elite university 0.45∗∗∗
(0.05)
Univ.: Bac+4, Science-Industry 0.23∗∗∗
(0.06)
Univ.: Bac+4, other 0.19∗∗∗
(0.12)
Univ.: Bac+3, Science-Industry 0.13∗∗
(0.06)
Univ.: Bac+3, other 0.13
(0.11)
Univ.: Bac+2 0.00
(0.07)
Tech.: Bac+2, Industry 0.37∗∗∗
(0.05)
Tech.: Bac+2, other 0.40∗∗∗
(0.05)
Health: Bac+2 0.48∗∗∗
(0.09)
Bac: Science −0.50∗∗∗
(0.18)
Bac: Technical, Industry 0.09
(0.08)
Bac: Technical, other 0.09
(0.07)
Bac: Vocational, Industry 0.43∗∗∗
(0.05)
Bac: Vocational, other 0.16∗∗
(0.08)
Bac-2: Vocational, Industry 0.59∗∗
(0.20)
Bac-2: Vocational, other −0.01
(0.02)
Lower Sec. Educ. Deg. −0.15
(0.10)
No diploma −1.21∗∗∗
(0.44)
Dummies for quarters Yes
Nobs 237,039
Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (Insee).
Note: Conditional logit model with ﬁxed eﬀects for the clusters. Standard errors are given between
parentheses. The estimation concerns the sample of majority individuals only.
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Table 4: Actual and counterfactual employment probabilities: estimation results
Speciﬁcations
Kernel Uniform Epanechnikov Uniform Epanechnikov
Bandwidth .05 .05 .10 .10
E[Y (0)|g = 0] 0.757
[0.755;0.760]
0.757
[0.755;0.760]
0.757
[0.754;0.761]
0.757
[0.754;0.760]
E[Y (0)|g = 0, a ∈M] 0.743
[0.739;0.747]
0.743
[0.738;0.748]
0.743
[0.738;0.747]
0.743
[0.737;0.749]
Ŷ 0.715
[0.691;0.720]
0.714
[0.692;0.720]
0.718
[0.708;0.723]
0.717
[0.706;0.721]
Ŷ 0.697
[0.667;0.706]
0.695
[0.667;0.708]
0.688
[0.671;0.699]
0.688
[0.672;0.696]
Ŷ
∗
0.683
[0.664;0.697]
0.681
[0.664;0.694]
0.685
[0.670;0.699]
0.685
[0.671;0.694]
E[Y (1)|g = 1, a ∈M] 0.550
[0.537;0.565]
0.550
[0.535;0.563]
0.550
[0.536;0.561]
0.550
[0.539;0.562]
E[Y (1)|g = 1] 0.550
[0.537;0.565]
0.550
[0.536;0.564]
0.550
[0.536;0.561]
0.550
[0.539;0.562]
ps 0.101
[0.045;0.111]
0.101
[0.042;0.106]
0.043
[0.016;0.047]
0.043
[0.016;0.049]
δy 0.018
[0.012;0.021]
0.018
[0.011;0.019]
0.009
[0.005;0.010]
0.009
[0.005;0.011]
δs 0.019
[0.007;0.020]
0.019
[0.006;0.020]
0.009
[0.003;0.011]
0.009
[0.003;0.011]
p∗s 0.040
[0.031;0.044]
0.040
[0.030;0.045]
0.027
[0.015;0.030]
0.027
[0.015;0.031]
δ∗y 0.009
[0.007;0.014]
0.009
[0.008;0.015]
0.007
[0.004;0.009]
0.007
[0.005;0.009]
δ∗s 0.013
[0.006;0.015]
0.014
[0.006;0.015]
0.009
[0.003;0.010]
0.009
[0.003;0.011]
Nobs minority 8432 8432 8432 8432
Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (Insee).
Note: In all speciﬁcations, the score is estimated by a conditional logit model (see Table 3). In this
table, the estimates of the quantities introduced in Section 4 are reported for diﬀerents settings of
the matching procedure. In columns 1 and 3, the matching kernel is a uniform, while in columns 2
and 4, an Epanechnikov kernel is used. In columns 1 and 2, the bandwidth is set to .05. In columns
3 and 4, the bandwidth is set to .10. The ﬁgures between square brackets are 95% conﬁdence
intervals, obtained by full bootstrap (with 100 iterations).
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Table 5: Actual and counterfactual employment probabilities: other populations
Variables Populations
Benchmark Women Southern 2 parents Only father
Population only Europe immigrants immigrant
E[Y (0)|g = 0] 0.757
[0.754;0.760]
0.711
[0.707;0.717]
0.757
[0.753;0.759]
0.757
[0.755;0.760]
0.757
[0.755;0.760]
E[Y (0)|g = 0, a ∈M] 0.743
[0.737;0.749]
0.693
[0.685;0.700]
0.759
[0.754;0.762]
0.736
[0.730;0.741]
0.738
[0.731;0.745]
Ŷ 0.718
[0.706;0.721]
0.664
[0.659;0.673]
0.759
[0.756;0.766]
0.719
[0.710;0.730]
0.713
[0.706;0.722]
Ŷ 0.688
[0.672;0.696]
0.650
[0.640;0.669]
0.763
[0.760;0.770]
0.685
[0.662;0.694]
0.696
[0.683;0.705]
Ŷ
∗
0.685
[0.671;0.694]
0.646
[0.635;0.663]
0.762
[0.759;0.770]
0.682
[0.661;0.694]
0.694
[0.683;0.703]
E[Y (1)|g = 1, a ∈M] 0.550
[0.539;0.562]
0.505
[0.490;0.521]
0.758
[0.749;0.766]
0.538
[0.523;0.553]
0.594
[0.574;0.612]
E[Y (1)|g = 1] 0.550
[0.539;0.562]
0.504
[0.488;0.520]
0.758
[0.749;0.766]
0.538
[0.523;0.553]
0.594
[0.573;0.611]
ps 0.043
[0.016;0.049]
0.073
[0.062;0.081]
0.015
[0.004;0.018]
0.015
[0.011;0.025]
0.028
[0.010;0.032]
δy 0.009
[0.005;0.011]
0.016
[0.012;0.022]
0.003
[0.001;0.004]
0.004
[0.003;0.008]
0.007
[0.003;0.010]
δs 0.009
[0.003;0.011]
0.015
[0.012;0.017]
0.005
[0.001;0.006]
0.002
[0.002;0.005]
0.007
[0.002;0.009]
p∗s 0.027
[0.015;0.031]
0.053
[0.045;0.059]
0.011
[0.004;0.014]
0.015
[0.011;0.024]
0.020
[0.010;0.025]
δ∗y 0.007
[0.005;0.009]
0.013
[0.009;0.017]
0.003
[0.001;0.003]
0.004
[0.003;0.008]
0.006
[0.002;0.009]
δ∗s 0.009
[0.003;0.011]
0.015
[0.012;0.017]
0.004
[0.001;0.006]
0.003
[0.002;0.004]
0.007
[0.002;0.008]
Nobs minority 8432 4448 11,653 5801 1946
Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (Insee).
Note: In all speciﬁcations, the score is estimated by a conditional logit model (see Table 3). This
table reports the estimates of the quantities introduced in Section 4 for several populations. In all
cases, the matching is performed with an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth set to .10.
The ﬁgures between square brackets are 95% conﬁdence intervals, obtained by full bootstrap (with
100 iterations).
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Figure 1: Size distribution of clusters
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Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (Insee).
Reading note: There are 10 clusters with exactly 1 observation.
Figure 2: Employment rate and share of dropouts as function of the share of the minority
group in the cluster
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Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (Insee).
Note: The x-axis is the share in the cluster of French individuals with at least one parent from North
Africa. Shades indicate 95% conﬁdence interval. Kernel regressions have been estimated using the
geom_smooth function in the ggplot2 package of R; see R Core Team (2014) and Wickham (2009).
Reading note: The employment rate in the majority population in clusters in which 10% of the
population are French individuals with North African parents is equal to 71%. In the same areas,
the employment of the French individuals with at least one North African parent is equal to 55%.
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Appendix.
A. 1. Distribution of employment rate and share of minority population
across clusters
Figure 3 displays, in bold, the kernel density estimate of the distribution of the share per unit
of French individuals with North African parents (left panel) and of the employment rate per
unit (right panel).
[Insert here Figure 3]
Because clusters are of relatively small size, one would not expect these distributions to look
like a Dirac, even in the case in which, in every unit, everyone had the same probability to
belong to the minority group (or to be employed). The estimate should be compared to the
simulated distribution  the thin line  obtained under the hypothesis that each cluster has
the same intrinsic probability and drawing outcomes in a binomial distribution. Both panels
of ﬁgure 3 show that the observed distributions are unambiguously more dispersed than the
simulated ones. In the left panel, the number of areas in which there is no individual from the
minority is almost twice as high as it would be in the homogeneity case. The upper tail of the
observed distribution is also notably thicker than the one of the simulated distribution, which
suggests that minority individuals tend to be concentrated in some areas. More evidence
on the level of ethnic segregation in France, measured with the same data, is provided by
Rathelot (2012). In the right panel, the observed distribution of the employment rate by
cluster also displays more dispersion than the simulated one. Interestingly, the lower tail of
the bold line, from .65 downwards, is higher than the thin line by many orders of magnitude.
This stresses the existence of distressed areas, in which the employment rate is especially low,
and corresponds to social segregation.
A.2. A linear model of sorting and employment
This subsection illustrates in a simple linear case that sorting on observables and unobservables
do not need to go in the same direction. Simple expressions for the set estimates introduced
in Section 4 are also provided.
Asymmetric sorting and within-cluster ethnic diﬀerentials in observables and un-
observables
Thoughout this section, we relax the assumption that there are only two locations. Space is
assumed to be continuous and a location is characterized by its quality q. The rest of the
framework is simpliﬁed and linear relationships are assumed between variables. g denotes the
individual ethnic group and is equal to one if the individual belongs to the minority group,
zero otherwise. The observable characteristics that are relevant to employment are assumed
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to be summarized by a real-valued function s(.), deﬁned such that the probability of being
employed is increasing in x = s(X). x is assumed to be lower on average in the minority group.
The quality of the neighborhood chosen by an individual increases in her characteristics x and
u and, based on the prediction from the previous subsection, decreases in g. Finally, the latent
variable y` determining the employment status is assumed to be increasing in x, u and q and
decreasing in g. We combine these assumptions to form the following system:
x = x∗ − δg (4)
q = β(x+ u)− γg + uq (5)
y` = ηx+ µu+ αq − λg + ue (6)
We consider the data-generating process deﬁned by equations (4)-(6), together with the as-
sumptions that x∗, g, u, uq, ue are random variables that are independent from each other.
Parameters α, β, γ, δ, λ, µ and η are assumed to be all positive. x∗ represents the observable
characteristics that the individual would have if he belonged to the majority group. In this
world, the distribution of the observables x is identical in both groups up to a translation
by δ. Given her characteristics x and u, an individual will live in a place of quality q, lower
for the minority group. Finally, given x, u, g and q, individuals draw a latent for employment.
In this case, by assumption, individuals from the majority live in better neighborhoods than
individuals from the minority. Conditional on x, the gap is equal to γ and, unconditional on
x, the gap is even larger, equal to γ + βδ, as individuals from the minority have on average
lower characteristics x. Empirically testing this prediction is not straightforward, as there
is no perfect measure of neighborhood quality. In order to provide tentative evidence, we
estimate s(X) at the individual level (and denote sˆ(.) the estimate) and consider a measure
of quality qˆi the share of individuals j in the cluster where i lives who have sˆ(Xj) higher than
sˆ∗90, which is the 90th percentile of the estimated sˆ(X) in the whole population.15 We regress
qˆi on sˆ(Xi) and the ethnicity dummy gi (in this case, having parents from North Africa).
We restrict the sample to individuals with sˆ(Xi) < s∗90 to avoid a direct correlation between
the two variables. In this case, the estimated value for γ is positive and strongly signiﬁcant,
with a t-statistic higher than 20, even when errors are clustered to account for within-cluster
correlation. With the dgp deﬁned with (4)-(6), γ is consistently estimated by OLS.
Now, how should characteristics x and u vary with the ethnic group, conditional on the
15The details of the estimation procedure of sˆ(X) are delayed to section 4.2.
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neighborhood quality q? From equation (5), if β 6= 0:
u =
1
β
q +
γ
β
g − x− 1
β
uq
x =
1
β
q +
γ
β
g − u− 1
β
uq
Regressing u on g, controlling for q and x, will not yield γ/β because of the correlation between
q and uq. OLS regression would provide an attenuated estimator, but with the same sign as
γ/β.
E[u|x, q, g = 1]− E[u|x, q, g = 0] = γ
β
1
1 +
V(uq)/β2
V(u)
Regressing x on g, controlling for q will also yield a inconsistent estimator, which may not
have the same sign as γ/β.
E[x|q, g = 1]− E[x|q, g = 0] = γ
β
1− δβγ V(uq)/β
2+V(u)
V(x∗)
1 +
V(uq)/β2+V(u)
V(x∗)
Even when γ/β is positive and when neighborhood quality is controlled for, ethnic minorities
may have on average lower observed characteristics than the majority. To be more precision,
a suﬃcient and necessary condition for this issue to arise is:
δ >
γ
β
V(x∗)
V(u) + V(uq)/β2
that is, when the diﬀerence δ in the expectation of x across groups and the eﬀect β of
characteristics on neighborhood quality are large relative to the sorting asymmetry γ or, when
the variance of the errors uq or the unobservables u is large compared to the within-group
variance of the observables x∗.
[Insert here Figure 4]
Figure 4 illustrates the issue qualitatively. Data are simulated following the dgp deﬁned by
equations (4)-(6). x∗, g, u, uq are random variables distributed as:
x∗ ∼ N(0, σ2x∗) u ∼ N(0, σ2u)
uq ∼ N(0, σ2uq) g ∼ Bernouilli(.5)
β = .6; γ = .8; δ = 1.7 σx∗ = 2;σ
2
u = 2.5;σ
2
uq = 3.
Characteristics (x in the left panel, u in the right panel) are on the x-axis and neighborhood
quality q is on the y-axis. The ﬁgures show scatterplots of the observations, for both groups
(majority group in red points and minority group in green triangles) as well as regression
lines for q as a function of x-axis variable (plain lines) and the x-axis variable as a function
of q (dotted lines). Green thin lines correspond to the minority group, red thick ones to the
31
majority group. In the left panel, it is clear that the reverse regression may lead to a change
of the sign of the ethnic diﬀerence in characteristics within neighborhoods. In the right panel,
the diﬀerence in unobservables is attenuated by the reverse regression but the sign remains
the same. If uq and u were very small, however, the points would be all very close to the
plain lines, and the dotted lines would coincide with the plain lines. In our sample, regressing
the estimated sˆ(X) on g, controlling for the share qˆ of individuals living in the cluster with
estimated sˆ(X) higher than s∗90 yields a signiﬁcantly negative estimate.16 Conditional on
neighborhood quality, individuals from the minority still have worse characteristics than those
from the majority. This empirical ﬁnding, which may seem paradoxical in a deterministic
framework, is well accounted for by our small stochastic linear model.
Set identiﬁcation in the simple linear model
Now, consider that the econometrician wants to use equation (6) to learn about λ, which is
the primary quantity of interest in this paper. Suppose, for simplicity, that she observes y`
the outcome, x the observable characteristics, q the neighborhood quality and g the group.
Regressing y` on x, q, and g will provide an estimate that controls for the existence of some
sorting. In this case, the OLS estimator of λ converges to:
λxq = E(y`|x, q, g = 1)− E(y`|x, q, g = 0)
= λ+ µ
γ
β
1
1 +
V(uq)/β2
V(u)
The econometrician may also forget about neighborhood quality or may have no information
about residential location, as in the vast majority of empirical studies about ethnic gaps. She
would regress y` on x and g only. In this case, the OLS estimator converges to:
λx = E(y`|x, g = 1)− E(y`|x, g = 0)
= λ− αγ
Under the assumptions made in subsection 3.2 and 3.3, λx and λxq are bounds for the true
quantity λ: λx < λ < λxq. Note that there are two interesting special cases. If there is no
causal eﬀect of the neighborhood on employment, α = 0, λx = λ and q should be omitted
from the regression. If sorting is symmetric, γ = 0, λxq = λx = λ, the estimator is consistent
whether or not controls for neighborhood quality are included.
A.3. Decomposition under two simplifying assumptions
Assumption 1-3 Assumptions 1 and 3 together imply that:
∀(X,u),E(Y (0)|X,u, g = 0) = E(Y (0)|X,u, g = 1) (7)
16This result still holds when cluster ﬁxed eﬀects are introduced to account for neighborhood quality instead
of qˆ.
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Then, by applying Bayes' law,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) =
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 1, X, u)φu|X,g=1(u|X, g = 1)dΦX|g=1(X|g = 1)
Using equation (7),
E(Y (0)|g = 1) =
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 0, X, u)φu|X,g=1(u|X, g = 1)dΦX|g=1(X|g = 1)
Using assumption 2,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) =
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 0, X, u)φu|X,g=0(u|X, g = 0)dΦX|g=1(X|g = 1)
So that,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) =
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 0, X)dΦX|g=1(X|g = 1) = Y
Assumption 1-2 and 4 Start by applying Bayes' law,
φu|X,a,g(u|X, a, g) =
P[a|X,u, g]φu|X,g(u|X, g)
P[a|X, g]
or, developping the denominator,
φu|X,a,g(u|X, a, g) =
P[a|X,u, g]φu|X,g(u|X, g)∫
P[a|X,u, g]dΦu|X,g(u|X, g)
Thus, using assumptions 2 and 4,
φu|X,a,g=0(u|X, a, g = 0) = φu|X,a,g=1(u|X, a, g = 1) (8)
Now, applying Bayes' law
E(Y (0)|g = 1) =
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 1, X, u, a)φu|X,a,g=1(u|X, a, g = 1)dΦX,a|g=1(X, a|g = 1)
Using equation (8) and assumption 1,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) =
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 0, X, u, a)φu|X,a,g=0(u|X, a, g = 0)dΦX,a|g=1(X, a|g = 1)
So that
E(Y (0)|g = 1) =
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 0, X, a)dΦX,a|g=1(X, a|g = 1) = Y
which provides one equality. We also have:
E(Y (0)|g = 1, X, u) =
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 1, X, u, a)P[a|X,u, g = 1]
Using assumptions 1 and 4, we obtain equation (7). As proved in the previous paragraph,
equation (7) together with assumption 2 leads to:
E(Y (0)|g = 1) = Y
Therefore, under assumptions 1, 2 and 4,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) = Y = Y
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 1
Using Bayes' law,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) =
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 1, X, u)φu|X,g=1(u|X, g = 1)dΦX|g=1(X|g = 1)
Using assumption 5,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) ≤
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 0, X, u)φu|X,g=1(u|X, g = 1)dΦX|g=1(X|g = 1)
Using assumption 2,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) ≤
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 0, X, u)φu|X,g=0(u|X, g = 0)dΦX|g=1(X|g = 1)
So that,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) ≤
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 0, X)dΦX|g=1(X|g = 1)
which shows the ﬁrst inequality.
Applying Bayes' law,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) =
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 1, X, a)dΦX,a|g=1(X, a|g = 1)
Using assumption 5,
E(Y (0)|g = 1) ≥
∫
E(Y (0)|g = 0, X, a)dΦX,a|g=1(X, a|g = 1)
which shows the second inequality.
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Figure 3: Distributions of the share of the minorities (left panel) and of the employment rate
(right panel) by cluster: observed and simulated under an homogeneity hypothesis
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Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (Insee).
Note: The left panel displays the distribution of French individuals with at least one parent of North
African origin; the right panel displays the distribution of the employment rate across units.
Figure 4: Simulations from the linear model: neighborhood quality, observable and unobserv-
able characteristics
Source: simulations.
Note: In the scatterplots, each point corresponds to an individual. Plain lines correspond to
regression lines of the variable on the y-axis (neighborhood quality q) on the variable on the x-axis
(x or u). Dotted lines correspond to reverse regressions: variable on the x-axis on variable on the
y-axis.
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